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PRIVILEGE REJECTED: UNITED STATES
v ARTHUR Y UNG & Co.
N 1975 the Internal Revenue Service began auditing Amerada Hess
Corporation's' tax returns for the years 1972-1974. The following
year, in response to publicity concerning the prevalence of corpora-
tions making illegal foreign payments, Amerada's board of directors en-
gaged an attorney and Arthur Young & Company 2 to investigate whether
Amerada had made any such payments. The investigation resulted in the
discovery of $7,830 of payments of questionable legality that Amerada had
deducted on its 1972-1974 tax returns.3 After Amerada informed the IRS
of those payments, the IRS initiated a criminal investigation. In April
1978, pursuant to civil and criminal investigations of Amerada's tax liabil-
ity, the IRS issued an Internal Revenue Code section 7602 summons 4 to
1. Amerada Hess Corporation is an integrated petroleum company with operations
worldwide. AMERADA HESS CORP., 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1984). During 1983 Amer-
ada had total revenue of $8,422,076,000 and net income of $205,347,000. Id. at 24. Amer-
ada's 1983 income tax expense totalled $541,801,000, including United States income taxes
of $37,363,000. Id at 30. On December 31, 1983, Amerada had current taxes payable of
$416,017,000 and deferred income taxes payable of $217,519,000. Id at 23.
2. Arthur Young & Company is the independent certified public accounting firm that
audited Amerada's financial statements. An independent certified public accounting firm's
primary function is to express an opinion as to whether its client's financial statements are
fairly presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Ancillary to
that function Arthur Young and many other independent certified public accounting firms
also offer tax and management consulting services to their clients.
3. These illegal payments consisted primarily of gifts to foreign government officials
and various political contributions.
4. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (1982) provides:
(a) Authority to summon, etc.
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, .. the Secre-
tary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or
any officer or employee of such person, or arty person having possession,
custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the busi-
ness of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other
person the Secretary may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a
time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers,
records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry; and
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Arthur Young to produce Arthur Young's tax accrual workpapers on
Amerada's contingent tax liability reserve.5 Upon Arthur Young's refusal
to comply with the summons, the IRS initiated proceedings in federal dis-
trict court to enforce it.6 Amerada intervened in those proceedings to op-
pose enforcement of the summons.7 The district court held the tax accrual
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
Prior to 1982, § 7602 consisted solely of subsection (a) without the heading "Authority to
summon, etc." In 1982 Congress amended § 7602 to add that heading and subsections (b),
which allows the IRS to take action under subsection (a) in connection with the administra-
tion or enforcement of the tax laws, and (c), which prevents the IRS from issuing a § 7602
summons if the IRS has referred the case to the Justice Department for possible criminal
prosecution for violation of the tax laws. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, tit. III, § 333(a), 96 Stat. 324, 621-23.
5. The accountant prepares tax accrual workpapers in the process of forming an opin-
ion on whether the corporation's tax liability is fairly stated in its financial statements. A
corporation includes both actual and contingent taxes payable in that liability amount. Cap-
lin, Government Access to Independent Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers, 1 VA. TAX
REV. 57, 59 (1981). Actual taxes payable include both taxes currently payable and taxes
attributable to the recognition of income in a different financial accounting period than the
tax reporting period (deferred or prepaid taxes). Potential taxes payable are a contingency
and are the tax payments that the corporation's management expects the corporation to
make after either negotiation or litigation with the IRS concerning the corporation's tax
treatment of certain transactions. Id. at 58-61. In tax accrual workpapers the accountant,
based on information the corporation's management has given him, analyzes whether that
recorded contingent tax liability and the actual tax liability are reasonable. Note, Govern-
ment Access to Corporate Documents and Auditors' Workpapers. Shall We Include Auditors
Among the Privileged Few, 2 J. CORP. L. 349, 357-58 (1977) (tax accrual workpapers consist
of copies of corporate documents, memoranda of conversations with corporate management,
and documentation of the corporation's negotiation and settlement strategy). Although they
are used only in the process of determining whether the tax liability is fairly stated on the
financial statements, the tax accrual workpapers document questionable tax positions the
corporation has taken and thereby pinpoint vulnerable areas on its tax return. Caplin,
supra, at 58-61.
6. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Arthur
Young refused to comply with the summons, contending that the court should not enforce
the summons of the tax accrual workpapers as a matter of policy. Arthur Young argued that
the court's enforcement of the summons would impair communications from corporate
management to the accountant, because corporate management would not disclose confi-
dential information if the IRS could summon the accountant's workpapers that documented
the information. Arthur Young believed these communications necessary for the accountant
to perform an effective audit. Arthur Young also objected to enforcement of the summons
on grounds that the summons was overbroad. In addition to asking for the tax accrual
workpapers and various administrative files and reports, the summons requested Arthur
Young's audit programs and audit workpapers for the years 1972-1974 and the joint work
with the attorney investigating the illegal payments. Audit programs are the accountant's
detailed plans on how to audit his client's financial statements, and audit workpapers are the
documentation of how the accountant accomplished those plans. For a complete list of what
the IRS summons requested, see United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 215 n.4
(2d Cir. 1982).
7. The taxpayer has the right to intervene in proceedings to enforce or to bring pro-
ceedings to quash a summons served on a third-party recordkeeper, which the statute defines
to include accountants, to produce documents concerning the taxpayer's tax liability. I.R.C.
§ 7609(b) (1982). See generally Kenderdine, The Internal Revenue Service Summons to Pro-
duce Documents- Powers, Procedures, and Taxpayer Defenses, 64 MINN. L. REV. 73, 81-85
(1979) (Congress enacted § 7609 to give the taxpayer a mechanism to protect his privacy).
The IRS had previously issued a § 7602 summons to Amerada for documents that Amerada
possessed. The court enforced the summons over Amerada's objections. United States v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 988 (3d Cir. 1980).
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workpapers relevant to the IRS investigations and refused to recognize an
accountant work-product privilege. 8 The court, therefore, ordered Arthur
Young to produce the workpapers pursuant to the summons.9 On appeal
the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the tax accrual
workpapers were relevant to the IRS investigations, ' 0 but, by a two-to-one
margin, recognized an accountant work-product privilege and refused to
enforce the summons."I The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 12 Held,
affirmed in part and reversed in part: Tax accrual workpapers are relevant
to an IRS investigation of a corporation's tax return, and no accountant
work-product privilege exists to prevent summons of such workpapers.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. 1495, 79 L. Ed. 2d 826
(1984).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECTION 7602 SUMMONS AND THE DOCTRINE
OF WORK-PRODUCT PRIVILEGE
A. The Section 7602 Summons
The Internal Revenue Code imposes a duty on the IRS to inquire
whether the taxpayer has paid all taxes owed.' 3 The section 7602 sum-
mons is the IRS's principal investigatory tool to make that inquiry. 14 Sec-
tion 7602 empowers the IRS to summon any documents relevant to a
determination of the validity of the tax paid by a taxpayer. ' 5 The statutory
power extends beyond the taxpayer to any person in possession of such
documents.16 The Supreme Court has held the invasions of privacy some-
times fostered by the section 7602 summons unavoidable if the IRS is to
8. 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The district court ordered Arthur Young
to comply with the summons except as to the work performed under the direction of the
attorney and the audit programs. The court found the former protected under the tradi-
tional attorney work-product privilege and the latter not relevant to Amerada's tax liability.
Id at 1160.
9. Id. at 1157.
10. 677 F.2d 211, 218-19 (1982).
11. Id. at 219-2 1. The court did, however, order Arthur Young to comply with the
summons as to all other items that the district court ordered to be produced. Id at 221. The
IRS had not appealed the district court's decision refusing to order Arthur Young to pro-
duce its audit programs and the work it had done concerning the illegal payments. For
commentaries on the Second Circuit's holding, see Note, Tax Accrual Workpapers and IRS
Summonses Under IRS § 7602. The Accountant Work-Product Privilege, 48 Mo. L. REV. 825
(1983); Note, Auditor-Client Work-Product Privilege With Respect to Tax Accrual File: The
Arthur Young Case, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 437 (1983).
12. The IRS petitioned, and certiorari was granted, on the issue of whether the IRS
could summon the tax accrual workpapers. The petitions and briefs submitted to the
Supreme Court are reprinted in 16 LAW REPRINTS (BNA) No. 6 (1983/1984 Term). Arthur
Young also petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Arthur Young contested the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision that ordered Arthur Young to produce its audit workpapers. That
petition, however, was denied. 104 S. Ct. 1906, 80 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1984).
13. I.R.C. § 7601(a) (1982); see also Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 523
(1971) (Court enforced a § 7602 summons issued for former employer's financial records
concerning taxpayer).
14. Brief for the United States at 16.
15. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (1982).
16. Id.
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enforce the self-reporting tax system. 17
The power of the section 7602 summons, however, is not unlimited.' 8
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized that such power is
subject to abuse and must be kept within proper bounds.' 9 Accordingly,
the section 7602 summons is not self-executing. The summoned party may
refuse to comply, thus compelling the IRS to petition a federal district
court for enforcement. 20 The IRS petition results in an adversarial sum-
mons enforcement proceeding before the court.21 The summoned party
may challenge enforcement of the summons for any valid reason,22 and
the IRS has the burden of showing proper grounds for enforcement. 23 The
Supreme Court, however, stated that a district court should enforce a sec-
tion 7602 summons unless a traditional privilege protects the documents24
or Congress intends that the IRS should not summon them.25 Congres-
sional intent may be inferred from either statutory prohibition or substan-
tial countervailing policies. 26
In United States v. Powel127 the Supreme Court delineated the limits of
section 7602 power. In Powell the IRS summoned the president of a cor-
poration to produce certain records relating to that corporation's tax re-
turns. He refused to comply on the ground that the IRS had already
examined the requested records once and, absent fraud, the statute of limi-
tations barred assessment of any additional deficiencies. 28 The Court held
that the IRS did not need to show probable cause of fraud and ordered
enforcement of the summons.29 The Court enumerated the following cri-
17. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146 (1975) (Court enforced summons is-
sued to bank officer for records disclosing who had made a certain deposit).
18. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 619 (10th Cir. 1977) (§ 7602
does not give IRS carte blanche discovery).
19. I.R.C. § 7604(b) (1982); United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 151 (1975) (Con-
gress placed federal courts between taxpayer and IRS to prevent IRS from abusing § 7602
summons power).
20. I.R.C. § 7604(b) (1982); see Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1964) (sum-
moned party not subject to contempt until refusal to comply with order of judge).
21. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446 (1964).
22. Id. at 449. The district court's order concerning enforcement of the summons is also
appealable. Id
23. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 318 (1978) (Court remanded
to lower court to determine if IRS had met good faith standards).
24. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714 (1980) (Court enforced summons issued to
taxpayer to appear and give handwriting samples for IRS comparison to handwriting on
various bank signature cards).
25. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975) (principles of statutory interpre-
tation require broad IRS power of inquiry not be frustrated "absent unambiguous directions
from Congress"); cf. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981) (separation of powers
requires courts to yield to congressional intent on issues Congress has addressed).
26. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980). Substantial countervailing policies
are those legislative purposes that Congress has manifested that the courts should give defer-
ence to in situations involving conflicting policies. See id. at 715-16.
27. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
28. The general rule is that the IRS must assess any additional tax within three years
after the tax return is filed. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1982). One of several exceptions to this general
rule, however, is that the IRS may assess additional taxes at any time when the taxpayer has
filed a false or fraudulent return with the intent of evading taxes. Id § 6501(c).
29. 379 U.S. at 51.
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teria as necessary before a court should enforce a section 7602 summons:
(1) the IRS investigation must be pursuant to a legitimate purpose; (2) the
documents summoned may be relevant to that purpose; (3) the IRS does
not already possess the information sought; and (4) the IRS has followed
the administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code.30 If a
summons satisfies these requirements, a court should enforce it unless priv-
ilege, statutory prohibition, or substantial countervailing policies can be
shown.
B. Work-Product Privilege
The privilege afforded an attorney's work-product precludes enforce-
ment of a section 7602 summons.3' The Supreme Court recognized this
privilege in Hickman v. Taylor.32 Hickman involved a discovery request
for an opposing attorney's reports concerning interviews conducted to aid
in the defense of a lawsuit. While the Court stated that the documents
were outside the scope of the traditional attorney-client testimonial privi-
lege, it concluded that documents that an attorney prepares in anticipation
of litigation are conditionally privileged.33 The attorney work-product
privilege assures each side's thorough preparation of his case.34 The privi-
lege is, therefore, grounded in the realities of the adversary system. 35 For
example, an attorney preparing a case often uses nonattorneys to investi-
gate and compile information. The panoply of the privilege necessarily
extends to these documents as well. 36 Not all documents prepared by an
attorney or his associates are privileged, however; only those prepared in
anticipation of litigation receive privileged treatment.
37
30. Id. at 57-58. Several of the courts of appeals adopted the test of whether the docu-
ments sought "might throw light upon" the correctness of the tax return as the required
standard of relevancy. E.g., In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015, 1019 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (court en-
forced summons of accountant's tax accrual workpapers on closely held corporation), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1678, 80 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1984); United States v. Southwestern Bank & Trust
Co., 693 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1982) (IRS issued summons to bank to produce bank
records on three individuals); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 537 (5th Cir. 1982)
(court enforced summons of corporation's tax account records), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1927,
80 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1984); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 1981) (four separate
cases involving IRS summonses for financial records issued to closely held corporations and
banks), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982); United States v. Richards, 631 F.2d 341, 345 (4th
Cir. 1980) (court enforced summons issued to corporation's president to appear and answer
questions concerning alleged illegal payments by the corporation); United States v. Freedom
Church, 613 F.2d 316, 321 (lst Cir. 1979) (court enforced summons issued to pastor to pro-
duce church records pursuant to IRS investigation of church's tax-exempt status); United
States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1978) (court enforced summons of corporate
internal audit reports), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d
1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973) (court refused to enforce summons of corporate budgets).
31. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981).
32. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
33. Id. at 511.
34. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
35. Id.
36. Id at 238-39.
37. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (suit seeking disclosure of Department of Energy documents pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act); cf. United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 521 (D. Colo. 1963)
112719851 NO TES
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The Supreme Court further defined the attorney work-product privilege
in Upjohn Co. v. United States.38 In Upjohn the corporate general counsel
investigated questionable payments made by foreign subsidiaries to for-
eign government officials. During the investigation the attorney docu-
mented interviews conducted with various employees. The IRS later
issued a section 7602 summons for the documents. The Court held that the
documents were conditionally privileged because the general counsel had
prepared them in anticipation of litigation. 39 The Court concluded that
the necessity of guarding the corporate general counsel's mental processes
precluded enforcement of the summons even though the IRS had a sub-
stantial need for the documents.4° Although the Court admonished that
such documents might not always be privileged, the Court did not exem-
plify a situation in which the IRS could summon them.4 1 Since the IRS
may not discover a witness's statements recorded by an attorney even
when the IRS shows substantial need, it follows that the Court will never
allow the IRS to discover an attorney's legal theories and strategies.42
In Couch v. United States,43 however, the Supreme Court noted that no
accountant-client testimonial privilege existed under federal law.44 The
actual issue in Couch, however, related to whether Couch's fifth amend-
ment rights barred enforcement of a summons issued to her accountant.4 5
Nevertheless, the Court's finding that no accountant-client testimonial
privilege existed became a formidable obstacle in the quest to forge an
accountant work-product privilege.46 Couch involved a sole proprietor of
a restaurant who gave her business records to an accountant for prepara-
tion of her tax returns. The IRS, while auditing those records in the ac-
countant's office, found indications that Couch had understated her tax
liability. The IRS consequently initiated a criminal investigation. After
the accountant refused to allow the IRS further access to the records, the
IRS issued a section 7602 summons to the accountant. When the account-
ant refused to comply with the summons, the IRS commenced enforce-
(work-product privilege obtains only when professional relationship between lawyer and
client exists). An attorney without a client cannot claim any work-product privilege. Mis-
souri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Elliott, 434 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Mo. 1968). An attorney employed in
the legal department of a corporation, however, may assert the work-product privilege so
long as he is working in anticipation of litigation. Scourtes v. Fred W. Albert Grocery Co.,
15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
38. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
39. Id at 401-02.
40. Id at 401. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine if the
IRS could demonstrate something greater than substantial need in order to pierce the attor-
ney work-product privilege. Id at 402.
41. Id at 401-02.
42. Id at 400; see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 510-1l; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). For
the development of the attorney work-product privilege since Hickman, see Annot., 35
A.L.R.3d 412 (1971).
43. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
44. Id at 335.
45. id at 323.
46. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. 1495, 1503, 79 L. Ed. 2d 826, 836
(1984).
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ment proceedings in federal court. 47 Couch intervened, asserting that her
fifth amendment rights barred enforcement of the summons.48
The Court reasoned that the fifth amendment provided only a personal
privilege.49 This privilege prevented the government from compelling a
person to incriminate himself 50 The summons, however, compelled the
accountant, not Couch, to produce the records.5' Couch's fifth amend-
ment rights were, therefore, inapposite to the summons issued to the ac-
countant. 52  Couch also argued that the confidential nature of the
accountant-client relationship extended her fifth amendment privilege to
the records that she gave her accountant. The Court summarily stated,
however, that no accountant-client privilege existed under federal law.53
Unlike in an attorney-client relationship, Couch had no expectation of pri-
vacy when she gave her records to the accountant, because she knew he
would disclose much of that information in her tax return.54 Her fifth
amendment privilege, therefore, did not extend to the records given to her
accountant. 55
United States v. Arthur Young & Co. presented the question of whether
the IRS could discover a taxpayer's legal theories and strategies as docu-
mented in his accountant's tax accrual workpapers. Hickman v. Taylor
and its progeny mandated that a party can never discover the legal theories
and strategies of its adversary. On this principle, a court would be re-
quired to refuse enforcement of the summons of workpapers. If a court
refused to enforce the summons, however, it would implicitly recognize the
accountant-client testimonial privilege that the Supreme Court had ex-
47. The accountant gave the records to Couch's attorney. The Court stated, however,
that Couch's constitutional rights became fixed when the IRS served the summons on the
accountant. 409 U.S. at 329.
48. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V. If the IRS
served Couch with the § 7602 summons to produce her business records, she would, by
producing those records, implicitly testify that she had produced all the records requested.
409 U.S. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The IRS could not investigate her tax liability if
she produced just some of the records. Id. In such instances the protections of the fourth
and fifth amendments effectively merge. Id at 348-49. The fourth amendment states: "[the]
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures shall not be violated ...... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
In United States v. Donaldson, however, the Court held that the IRS may use the § 7602
summons to investigate what may later prove to be criminal conduct. 400 U.S. at 535-36.
To hold otherwise would force the IRS to forgo either use of the summons or recommenda-
tions for criminal prosecution in cases of suspected fraud. 1d The IRS need only issue the
summons in good faith prior to referral of the case to the Justice Department for criminal
prosecution. Id at 536; see I.R.C. § 7602(c) (1982).
49. 409 U.S. at 328.
50. Id
51. Id. at 329.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 335.
54. Id. But see CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS § 301.01 (American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accounts 1982) ("A member shall not disclose any confidential information ob-
tained in the course of a professional engagement except with the consent of the client.")
Couch's accountant was not a certified public accountant.
55. 409 U.S. at 335.
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pressly rejected in Couch, because the workpapers were based upon ac-
countant-client communications. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide which precedent should control.
II. UNITED STATES V. ARTHUR YOUNG & Co.
The Supreme Court addressed two issues in United States v. Arthur
Young & Co. First, as measured against the relevancy standard the Court
had enunciated in United States v. Powell, the question remained whether
the tax accrual workpapers were relevant to the IRS audit of Amerada's
tax returns. If the tax accrual workpapers were not relevant, the summons
was not enforceable. Second, if the tax accrual workpapers were relevant,
an accountant work-product privilege nevertheless might preclude en-
forcement of the summons. In a unanimous decision, the Court held the
tax accrual workpapers relevant to the IRS investigations and that no ac-
countant work-product privilege existed to preclude the enforcement of the
summons.
56
A. Section 7602 Standard of Relevancy
In considering whether the tax accrual workpapers were relevant to the
IRS investigations,5 7 the Court noted that the relevancy standard required
to enforce the summons involved a lesser test than the standard used in
deciding whether to admit evidence in court. 58 The statutory language
"may be relevant"5' 9 reflected Congress's intent that the IRS might sum-
mon items of even potential relevance. 60 Congress, the Court noted, could
not have expected the IRS to know whether the item was in fact relevant
until after the IRS had procured and scrutinized it.6 ' The Court stated
that section 7602 summons power remains critical to the IRS's enforce-
ment of the tax laws, and courts should not circumscribe the IRS's use of
that power to only documents actually relevant. 62 The Court deemed any
document that would "illuminate any aspect of the return" as relevant to
an IRS investigation.63 The Court found that the tax accrual workpapers
56. 104 S. Ct. at 1502-03, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 834, 836.
57. Courts that had considered the issue were divided on whether an accountant's tax
accrual workpapers were relevant to an IRS tax investigation. See In re Newton, 718 F.2d
1015, 1020 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1678, 80 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1984) (relevant);
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 1977) (not relevant);
United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (relevant).
58. 104 S. Ct. at 1501, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 834. Compare United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at
57 (IRS does not need to meet the standard of probable cause), with FED. R. EvID. 401
(relevant evidence is evidence that tends to make existence of fact more or less probable).
59. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (1982).
60. 104 S. Ct. at 1501, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 834.
61. Id.
62. Id
63. Id at 1501-02, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 834. The Court noted that several of the courts of
appeals used "might have thrown light" upon the correctness of the tax return as the rele-
vancy standard. Id at 1501 n.ll, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 833-34 n.l. The Court, nevertheless,
adopted "illuminate any aspect of the return" as the standard. Id. at 1501-02, 79 L. Ed. 2d at
834. Illuminate means "to supply or brighten with light." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COL-
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highlighted Amerada's questionable tax positions and thereby focused the
IRS on areas of possible noncompliance with the tax laws.64 The tax ac-
crual workpapers were therefore highly relevant, even though not used to
prepare the tax return.65
The Court's holding rejected the proposition that relevancy depended
upon balancing the competing interests in a given situation. 66 The balanc-
ing approach employed a sliding standard of relevancy that depended
upon the nature of the material sought, the party from whom it was
sought, and the necessity of the information sought, to determine the cor-
rectness of the tax return.67 The Court instead adopted the straightfor-
ward approach that relevancy involved the logical relationship between
the material sought and the tax return.68 Documents that illuminated any
aspect of the tax return were relevant. 69 The Court adopted a clear and
easily appliable standard as opposed to an amorphous and complex one.
70
Defining relevancy in terms of balancing competing interests would result
in uncertainty in the summons enforcement process. 71
The Court also rejected the argument that section 7602 did not allow
summons of nonfactual material. 72 The bulk of the tax accrual
workpapers contained judgmental material. To the extent that the tax ac-
crual workpapers contained facts, Arthur Young argued that the IRS
could otherwise obtain those facts.73 By rejecting that argument, the Court
avoided drawing a fine line between fact and judgment and the paradoxi-
cal result of the taxpayer's determining whether the IRS had obtained all
of the relevant facts.
The Court adopted a very broad standard of relevancy necessary for
enforcement of a section 7602 summons. Virtually any document tangen-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 599 (1984). Whether the Court meant to change the relevancy stan-
dard used by several of the courts of appeals when it adopted the different but very similiar
language of "illuminate any aspect of the return" is unclear.
64. 104 S. Ct. at 1500, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 833.
65. Id at 1502, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 834.
66. See Brief of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae at
17.
67. Id See generally Note, Tax Accrual Workpapers and IRS Summonses Under IRC
§ 7602. The Accountant Work-Product Privilege, 48 Mo. L. REV. 825, 836 (1983) (advocating
that courts limit summons to factual material only); Note, A Balancing Approach to the Dir-
coverability ofAccountants' Tax Liability Workpapers Under Section 7602 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 185, 208 (1982) (accountants should divide tax accrual
workpapers between factual and nonfactual material and court should not enforce summons
of nonfactual material absent extraordinary need).
68. See Reply Brief for the United States at 15. The balancing approach incorporates
policy decisions that are only significant in determining whether the court should recognize
a privilege, not whether the documents are relevant. Id
69. 104 S. Ct. at 1501-02, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 834.
70. See Reply Brief for the United States at 15.
71. Id
72. See 104 S. Ct. at 1502, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 834. Contra P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 63 T.C. 404, 414 (1974) (judgmental information not relevant); Esson v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 586, 587 (1975) (taxpayer not permitted to discover judgmental
material concerning how IRS valued stock for gift tax purposes).
73. Brief for Arthur Young & Co. at 2.
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tially related to the taxpayer's business may focus the IRS on potential
areas of noncompliance with the tax laws and, therefore, illuminate an
aspect of the tax return. 74 The document does not need to be factually
oriented or in the possession of the taxpayer. The Court sanctioned a
broad intrusion into taxpayers' affairs to facilitate the IRS's tax compli-
ance investigations. 75
B. Accountant Work-Product Privilege Rejected
The Court then addressed whether an accountant work-product privi-
lege should nevertheless preclude summons of the tax accrual workpapers.
In noting that the section 7602 summons was central to Congress's design
of the tax enforcement system, the Court deemed the summons power nec-
essary to the adequate investigation of compliance with the tax laws by the
IRS. 76 Inadequate investigations would, the Court concluded, lead to an
inequitable distribution of the national tax burden.77 The Court, there-
fore, would uphold IRS summons authority absent statutory prohibition or
substantial countervailing policies. 78
The Court found that in Arthur Young no statutory prohibition against
enforcement of the summons existed. 79 Reading section 7602 literally, the
Court discerned a congressional policy favoring disclosure.80 The Court
did not attempt to reconcile section 7602 with section 6661, which imposes
a penalty on the taxpayer for any understatement of taxes attributable to
tax positions of questionable validity.8 ' The taxpayer avoids imposition of
the penalty, however, upon disclosure of facts relevant to the questionable
position.8 2 Section 6661 therefore encourages, rather than requires, tax-
payer disclosure of items on which the taxpayer might not have complied
with the correct interpretation of the tax laws.8 3 This section, however,
appears pointless if the IRS already has the power to demand disclosure of
74. See generally Stolenberg & Robinson, Enforcement of Summonses in Requesting Ac-
countants' Workpapers, 60 TAXES 673, 682 (1982) (workpapers usually relevant, whereas au-
dit programs usually not because of tenuous relationship to tax matters).
75. The Court noted that the alternatives to enforcement of the self-reporting tax system
might involve even more egregious invasions of privacy. 104 S. Ct. at 1502, 79 L. Ed. 2d at
835 (quoting United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. at 146).





81. I.R.C. § 6661 (1982). Section 6661 was enacted subsequent to the Second Circuit's
decision in Arthur Young. Section 6661 is arguably an answer to the Second Circuit's invita-
tion to Congress to enact a statute to summon tax accrual workpapers. 677 F.2d at 221; see
Brief for Amerada Hess Corp. at 30; cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683,
689, 74 L. Ed. 2d 548, 557-58 (1983) (Congress's failure to amend certain overlapping provi-
sions when revising securities laws constituted ratification of established judicial interpreta-
tion of those provisions). See generally Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 543 (1947) (when interpreting one statute, courts consider
statutes subsequently enacted).
82. I.R.C. § 6661 (1982).
83. Id
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these items through summons of the tax accrual workpapers. 84 The Court's
narrow focus on section 7602, without analysis of its interrelationship with
section 6661, reflects a staunch unwillingness to circumscribe IRS sum-
mons power. 85
The Court also found no substantial countervailing policies precluding
enforcement of the summons.86 The Court, therefore, rejected the ac-
countant work-product privilege recognized by the court of appeals.87 Rec-
ognition of that privilege conflicted with the clear intent of Congress that
taxpayers disclose all relevant information to the IRS.88 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court analyzed and rejected three policy arguments favor-
ing recognition of an accountant work-product privilege for tax accrual
workpapers.
First, the Court rejected the proposition that the accountant work-prod-
uct privilege was analogous to the attorney work-product privilege recog-
nized in Hickman v. Taylor.89 In agreeing with the IRS, the Court found
that the putative work-product privilege was in essence an accountant-
client testimonial privilege. 90 Except for the accountant's judgment on the
sufficiency of the tax reserve, the accountant received all information doc-
umented in the tax accrual workpapers from the taxpayer. Quoting
Couch,9 the Court noted that no accountant-client testimonial privilege
existed under federal law. 92 The Court also noted the differences between
the roles of the attorney and the accountant, stating that the attorney is his
client's confidential advisor and advocate and is thereby charged with the
duty to present the client's case in the most favorable light.93 The account-
ant, however, is a "public watchdog" who has a public responsibility tran-
scending his relationship with the taxpayer. 94 The accountant's
responsibilities to creditors, stockholders, and the investing public demand
that he remain totally independent from his client.95
Analysis of the rationale behind the attorney work-product privilege
supports the Court's rejection of this analogy.96 The Court recognized an
attorney-client privilege that allows the attorney to prepare his case in pri-
vacy.97 Such privacy is necessary to ensure each adversary's thorough
84. Brief for the El Paso Co. as Amicus Curiae at 29.
85. The Court stated that any choice that circumscribed § 7602 power was for Congress,
not the courts, to make. 104 S. Ct. at 1502, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 835.
86. Id at 1503-05, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 836-38.




91. 409 U.S. at 335.
92. 104 S. Ct. at 1503, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 836.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id; cf. United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 1975) (criminal case
against accountants for not disclosing inaccuracies discovered in financial statements previ-
ously audited); CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS § 52 (American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants 1982) (an accountant should be independent from his clients).
96. Brief for the United States at 35.
97. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 510-11.
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preparation of his case, with consequential discovery of the truth and pro-
tection of the wronged party's rights.98 The accountant, however, ex-
presses an opinion to the public on the fairness of the taxpayer's financial
statements. Protection of the taxpayer's substantive rights does not require
the accountant to perform this function privately.99 The Court's inability
to reconcile the proposed accountant work-product privilege with the at-
torney work-product privilege, however, does not preclude its recogni-
tion. I°° Recognition of a privilege should result whenever the interest
needing protection is so important that it justifies suppression of the privi-
leged information.' 10
The Court rejected Arthur Young's second argument that nonrecogni-
tion of an accountant work-product privilege would adversely affect the
securities markets. 10 2 Arthur Young argued that without the privilege the
candid communications from the taxpayer to the accountant concerning
the taxpayer's financial matters, vital to the accountant's performance of
an effective audit, would not exist.' 0 3 The taxpayer, knowing that the IRS
could summon any information given to the accountant, would not com-
municate candidly and would prepare a less thorough analysis of the cor-
poration's contingent tax liabilities for the accountant to evaluate. 1°4 If
provided with less and possibly insufficient information, the likelihood
98. See id
99. The Court noted that insulating the accountant from disclosure would ignore the
importance of his public obligations. 104 S. Ct. at 1503, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 836.
100. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Comm. on Corporate Law Dep'ts of the Ass'n of the Bar
of the City of New York at 8-9.
101. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (law of privilege not frozen,
but expands as need for particular privilege manifests); FED. R. EVID. 501; C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 152 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); see, e.g., United States v.
Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (police surveillance locations qualifiedly privi-
leged); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715-17 (3d Cir. 1979) (journalist's sources
qualifiedly privileged); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (peni-
tent-minister privilege).
102. 104 S. Ct. at 1503, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 836.
103. Brief for Arthur Young & Co. at 19-20; see Brief for Amerada Hess Corp. at 18-20;
Brief of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae at 26-30; Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States at 5-8; Brief for the El
Paso Co. as Amicus Curiae at 26-28; Brief of Tax Executives Institute, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
at 22-23; see also United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953-54 (D. Colo.
1975) (accountant's testimony of how audit would be hampered if IRS could summon tax
accrual workpapers), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
104. Brief of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae at 28.
The tax department of a major corporation, under the direction of in-house counsel, usually
prepares the analysis of contingent taxes that is given to the accountant for evaluation. Brief
for the El Paso Co. as Amicus Curiae at 5.
The Court did not address the possibility that the tax accrual workpapers prepared by in-
house counsel were privileged under the traditional attorney work-product privilege. An
IRS tax investigation, however, is an adversary process. Walter, Changes in Strategic Posi-
tions Between the IRS and Tax Practitioners." Impact of the Disclosure of Information, 58
TAXES 815, 816 (1980). The corporation's tax department arguably prepared the tax accrual
analysis with an eye towards this adversary process and the resultant privilege. Brief for the
El Paso Co. as Amicus Curiae at 8. Contra United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542-
44 (5th Cir. 1982) (tax accrual analysis corporation prepared not protected under attorney
work-product privilege), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1927, 80 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1984).
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that an accountant will issue an unqualified opinion increases. 0 5 The
amount of false financial information supplied to securities investors also
increases. 106
Arthur Young recognized a conflict between unhindered investigation of
tax law compliance and full disclosure of financial information to securi-
ties investors. The accounting firm argued that summons of the tax ac-
crual workpapers was convenient, but unnecessary for IRS investigation of
tax law compliance. The need for frank communications from the tax-
payer to the accountant, however, was essential if securities investors were
to receive the financial information the securities laws mandated. 07 Ar-
thur Young, therefore, proposed to resolve this conflict in favor of the ne-
cessity of the securities laws, rather than the convenience of the tax laws.
The Court reasoned, however, that the accountant could not issue an un-
qualified opinion based upon insufficient information. 08 Anything other
than an unqualified opinion sends negative vibrations about the corpora-
tion's financial health to the securities markets, detrimental to the value of
the corporation's stock. 1 9 Corporate management would not risk this." 0
Fear of receiving other than an unqualified opinion from the accountant
would compel management to confer candidly with the accountant, even
without an accountant work-product privilege. I1  The Court, therefore,
found no conflict between the tax and securities laws, reasoning that a cor-
porate taxpayer would not risk the possibly deleterious consequences of
withholding information from the accountant." 12
The Court's analysis of the alleged conflict between the securities and
105. An accountant will issue one of four possible opinions on his client's financial state-
ments. An unqualified opinion states that the accountant believes the client's financial state-
ments to be fairly presented in all material respects. STATEMENTS ON AUDITING
STANDARDS § 509.28 (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1982). A qualified
opinion states that the accountant believes the client's financial statements to be fairly
presented in all material respects except for enumerated departures from generally accepted
accounting principles or subject to the resolution of an uncertainty. Id § 509.29. An ad-
verse opinion states that the accountant believes that the client's financial statements do not
fairly present the client's financial condition and the results of its operations. Id § 509.41.
Finally, a disclaimer of opinion states that the accountant does not have sufficient informa-
tion from which to form an opinion on the fairness of the client's financial statements. Id.
§ 509.45.
106. See Brief of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants at 30.
107. See 677 F.2d at 220-21.
108. 104 S. Ct. at 1503, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 836-37. When an accountant has insufficient
information from which to render an opinion, he must issue a disclaimer of opinion. STATE-
MENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS § 509.45 (American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants 1982).
109. 104 S. Ct. at 1503, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 837.
110. Id. at 1504, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 837.
111. Id A public corporation has a statutory duty to make all necessary disclosures to its
accountants. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (1982);
17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to .2-02 (1983). The Court recognized in Upjohn, however, that a
legal duty alone would not ensure candid communications. 449 U.S. at 393 n.2.
112. 104 S. Ct. at 1504, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 837. The Court noted that the recognition of an
accountant work-product privilege might diminish the accountant's appearance of indepen-
dence and thereby reduce the value of the audit function. Id at 1504 n. 15, 79 L. Ed. 2d at
837 n. 15. See generally Note, supra note 11, at 836 (arguing against recognition of account-
ant work-product privilege as undermining public's confidence in audit process).
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tax laws rested on two pillars of questionable strength. First, the Court
assumed the accountant to be an uncanny judge of veracity. The Court
failed to consider the possibility that the accountant might not realize
management was withholding information. Relying somewhat pragmati-
cally on management's business sense, the Court reasoned that manage-
ment will disclose all to the accountant, rather than risk something less
than an unqualified opinion. 13 Second, the Court's rationale implied that
the accountant will unhesitatingly bite the hand that feeds him. 114 The
corporation, however, and not the public pays the accountant. Thus, the
Court's analysis appears to center on management's acute business sense
and the accountant's lack thereof.
The Court then addressed the third argument for the recognition of an
accountant work-product privilege, that fundamental fairness precluded
IRS access to the tax accrual workpapers. 1 5 The Court observed that
either the Securities and Exchange Commission in an investigation or a
private plaintiff involved in litigation would have access to those
113. Former IRS Commissioners Mortimer Caplin and Roscoe Egger do not agree with
the Court that IRS access to the accountant's tax accrual workpapers will not impair the
integrity of the financial reporting process. Caplin, supra note 5, at 81-82 (IRS access to the
accountant's tax accrual workpapers should be limited as such access impairs integrity of
financial audit process, thereby harming public's interest in full financial statement disclo-
sure); Address by Comm'r Egger, Joint Meeting of San Francisco CPA Soc'y and San Fran-
cisco Bar Ass'n (May 5, 1981), text reprinted in 86 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) J-I (May 5, 1981)
(IRS revised guidelines on summoning tax accrual workpapers because of negative effects
IRS access has on quality of financial reporting); see also Hanson & Brown, CPA's
Workpapers: The IRS Zeros In, 152 J. ACCT. 68, 76 (1981) (IRS summons of tax accrual
workpapers will destroy valuable accountant-client dialogue concerning tax reserve); Hor-
vitz & Hainkel, The IRS Summons Power and Its Effect on the Independent Auditor, 4 J.
ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 114, 127 (1981) (IRS summons of tax accrual workpapers may
adversely affect disclosure); Note, IRS Access to Tax Accrual Workpapers: Legal Considera-
tions and Policy Concerns, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 468, 488 (1982) (courts should recognize
accountant work-product privilege analogous to attorney work-product privilege to protect
integrity of financial reporting process); Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents
andAuditors' Workpapers." Shall We Include Auditors Among the Privileged Few, 2 J. CORP.
L. 349, 388 (1977) (proposing Congress enact legislation recognizing accountant-client testi-
monial privilege); Note, A Balancing Approach. to the Discoverabilitfy ofAccountants' Tax
Liability Workpapers Under Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
185, 208 (1982) (courts should not enforce summons of accountant's tax accrual workpapers
absent extraordinary need); cf. Caplin, Reflections on IRS Criminal Tax Investigations of
Corporations, 12 CuM. L. REv. 233, 260 (1982) (because tax system is based on voluntary
compliance, the IRS must treat taxpayers fairly); Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted to
Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers, 51 J. TAX'N 194, 200 (1979) (IRS should use
restraint in summoning tax accrual workpapers).
114. A public company must inform both the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the company's shareholders of the reason why its accountant was discharged or resigned. 17
C.F.R. §§ 229.304, 240.14a-3 (1983). The company then must request the accountant to in-
form the Securities and Exchange Commission if that reason is correct. 4 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 31,003, Item 4(d), at 21,995 (May 23, 1984). From a pragmatic viewpoint, however,
the management of other corporations will probably think twice before engaging an ac-
countant who has made trouble for another corporation with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, a fact not lost upon accountants.
115. 104 S. Ct. at 1504, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 837. In United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 103 S.
Ct. 3133, 3143, 77 L. Ed. 2d 743, 758 (1983), the Court recognized fundamental fairness as a
reason to impose limits on investigation and discovery in denying the government automatic
access to grand jury materials.
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workpapers.11 6 The Court reasoned that the IRS should not be more lim-
ited in its investigatory power." 17 The Court also noted the IRS's revised
and more stringent guidelines for issuing summonses to accountants." l8
Although not effective as to the Arthur Young summons, the Court inter-
preted the new guidelines to reflect the IRS's sensitivity to the intrusive-
ness of the summons and to indicate that the IRS would not abuse its
summons power." 19
In a self-assessment tax system the taxpayer possesses all the facts. The
IRS must have access to those facts to ensure compliance with the tax laws.
Summons of tax accrual workpapers may reveal some of the facts. A sum-
mons also reveals, however, the taxpayer's theories and strategies for nego-
tiation and litigation of questionable tax positions. The IRS, therefore,
discovers the taxpayer's game plan, but the courts cannot allow the tax-
payer to discover the IRS's theories and strategies in order to even the
score. To do so would not only fly in the face of Hickman v. Taylor, but
would also disrupt and overburden our federal courts with hoards of tax-
payers seeking to discover the IRS's theories and strategies on deficiency
assessments. The IRS, it appears, has discovered the elusive single-edged
sword. 12 0
Arthur Young and Amerada made sound arguments for recognition of
an accountant work-product privilege. Without that privilege the tax-
payer's only recourse to prevent the IRS from discovering theories and
strategies is to withhold that information from the accountant. Withhold-
ing the information may result in an unqualified opinion based on insuffi-
cient information. On the other hand, if the taxpayer chooses to disclose
those theories and strategies, the result might be the same result that the
Court admonished in Hickman v. Taylor. The taxpayer might choose not
to rationalize the tax positions he takes because he knows that the IRS can
obtain them through the tax accrual workpapers. Instead the taxpayer
might choose to take a tax position now and rationalize it later when the
IRS contests it, with the attorney work-product privilege protection of the-
ories and strategies developed in anticipation of that tax litigation.' 21
Again the accountant would base his opinion on insufficient information,
in this instance because the taxpayer has yet to develop the information,
rather than because the taxpayer has withheld it.
116. 104 S. Ct. at 1504, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 837-38; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1982) (Securities and Exchange Commission may summon documents
relevant to inquiry); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (parties to civil litigation may discover relevant
documents not privileged).
117. 104 S. Ct. at 1504, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 838.
118. Id; see I INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) § 4024.4 (May 14, 1981) (IRS agent
may summon accountant's tax accrual workpapers in unusual circumstance that IRS cannot
obtain certain factual data from taxpayer's records). But see United States v. I.C. Indus.,
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 219, 222 (N.D. Il. 1983) (IRS not required to comply with own
guidelines).
119. 104 S. Ct. at 1505, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 838.
120. Contra Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 515 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[d]iscovery is
a two-edged sword").
121. The emphasis in tax law might shift from tax planning to tax litigation.
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Rejection of the accountant work-product privilege, however, appears
necessary. 22 Privileges exist because the interests protected are more im-
portant than the rights denied because those privileges shroud the truth.123
The government's right to enforce the tax laws is paramount. 24 The gov-
ernment must collect tax revenue to function. To justify an accountant
work-product privilege, therefore, the interest of certain taxpayers in keep-
ing their tax theories and strategies from the IRS must outweigh the right
of all individuals to an effective government. Few, if any, privileges could
pass such a test; the accountant work-product privilege certainly cannot.
III. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co. the Supreme Court decided two
issues concerning the section 7602 summons. First, the Court determined
tax workpapers relevant to IRS tax compliance investigation. The rele-
vancy standard necessary to enforce the summons is the logical relation-
ship between the document sought and the investigation. Anything that
might illuminate an aspect of the tax return is relevant. The definition of
relevant, therefore, encompasses a very broad spectrum. The Court deter-
mined this latitude necessary for IRS enforcement of compliance with the
self-assessment tax system. Second, the Court refused to recognize an ac-
countant work-product privilege. Although the Court was not convinced,
lack of such a privilege will probably adversely affect some financial au-
dits. Some companies will receive unwarranted audit opinions vouching
for nonexistent financial strength. A securities investor, however, must as-
sume this risk, since the government must collect tax revenue to function.
Any privilege that directly impairs the IRS's enforcement of the tax laws
and the consequent collection of such tax revenues must, therefore, over-
come the right of all individuals to an effective government. The interest
Arthur Young sought to protect and the consequent privilege it sought to
forge could not overcome this right.
Scott W Roloff
122. Contra Note, Auditor-Client Work-Product Privilege With Respect to Tax Accrual
File: The Arthur Young Case, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 437, 459 (1983) (Second Circuit's recog-
nition of accountant work-product privilege was necessary).
123. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 101, at 152.
124. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. at 336 (society has legitimate interest in en-
forcement of tax laws).
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